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NEGOTIATING OF ZERO WITHHOLDING ON PORTFOLIO DIVIDENDS:
AN INVITATION TO RESEARCH
by J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.
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The U.S. corporate sector is an enormous capital
importer. Regrettably, American
federal tax law substantially
encourages
these financial inflows to be
structured as portfolio holdings
of U.S, corporate debt
rather than as investments
in U.S. corporate shares.'
Part of this syst mic bias results
from the fact that
corporate
interest paym nts are usually deductible
under the federal income tax but dividend distributions are not. Thus, interest payments do not bear the
U.S. corporate income tax, while dividends must be
distributed out of corporate
r ceipts, which have been
sUbJe~ted to a 34·percent lax. However, another major
contnbutor to the bias in favor of portfolio debt' is the
U.S: decision in 1984 to statutorily
drop the withholdIng tax rate to zero on interest (including original issue
discount) received by foreigners
with respect to their
portfolto holdings of A merican corporate debt.' In contrast, gross dividends
paid
to foreigners on U.S.
portfoho stock' investments
are subject to a 30-percent

,

a dl~epartment of the Treasury, "Integration or the Individual
7~ 19~rporate.Tax Systems. Taxing Business LncomcOnce," 49,
\
2) (heremafter cited as "Treasury Integration Report").
fOlio~hen used in this paper with respect to debt, the term "portby a tr~~a.ns corporate debt that is held as a passive investment
Orb
Itlonal unrelated Investor as opposed to a loan by a bank
ya substantial shareholder of the debtor.
.'secu
Intern II~ns 871(h) and 881 (e). All statutory references are to the
4
a
evenus COde of 1986.
fOlio':'!hcn used in this paper with respect to stock the term "portiSsuer,~ean.s stock that rcpres(!nt~ such a small p~rcentage of the
OVerth ~otmg shares that the Owner has no meaningful influence
X.2.(<ll.e ISSuer. COlllpnr(' Unitl'd Slatcs..canada
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statutory withholding
rate,' which is usually reduced
to 15 percent in bilateral treaties.s
Foreign investors presumably respond to these factors by substituting portfolio investments in U.S. corporate debt for purchases of portfolio equity.' To the
extent that foreigners behave in this way,' U.S. corporations are more leveraged than they would otherwise
be,' and the federal income tax base is eroded by interest payments that bear a zero tax rate both at the cor-

'Sections 871(0)(1) and 881(0)(1).
6See, e.g., United States-Canada Income Tax Treaty X.2.(b). Furthermore, a 15~percent treaty withholding rate on dividends
appears to be an international standard. ALl Federal Income Tax
Project, Tentative Draft No. 16, United States Income Tax Treaties
184 (1991) (hereinafter cited as "ALI Tax Treaty Report").
"Poreign banks borrow funds and relend them to U.S. corporations, thus incurring substantial interest costs that arguably make
a 3D-percent or IS-percent withholding tax on gross interest an
inappropriate levy. However, there would appear to be no difference
between the costs of investors in portfolio debt and investors in
portfolio shares. See notes 2 and 4. Thus, the dramatically
more
generous tax regime for portfolio debt investments creates a clear
preference for such investments over corporate share purchases.
'Some foreigners continue to buy corporate shares in the face
of these facts. Treasury Integration Report 49. These investors are
given a structural incentive to pur~hase ~rowth.stocks inst~ad of
dividend-paying shares because capital gall1s realized .by foreigners
on stock sales are usually exempt from U.S. tax. Section 871 (a)(2);
Trees Reg section 1.1441-2(a)(3); 1 Joseph lsenbergh, IJltemotiollaj
Taxation 238 (1990). As a result of this treatment of capital gains,
foreign investors in U.S. growth stocks ~ancreate a tax-free cash
flow by periodically selling pa.rt of their shares. T~ this extent,
portfolio stock investments receive tax treatment equlva lent t? the
lax treatment of portfolio debt inveSlm~nts. H.owever, there IS no
reason for such a dramatic structural bias agamst shares that pay
regular dividends. Furthermore, market condi~ions an.d investor
objectives will make growth stocks unattrach~e at times, thus
effectively limiting foreign investors to a choice between
debt
instruments and dividend-paying
shares.
"The increased corporate debt burden resulting from the in~o~e
tax s stem's preference of corporate debt ov~r corporate eqU!ty IS
id
regarded as distorted investor behavior that results III an
wffl. ~ Y
loss c,.,> Treasury Integration Report 115-16; ALI Federal
elclCllCY
.Jl
·N 21 R
t'
Income Tax Project, Tax Advisory Group Draft 0: ' epor er,s
Stud 34.37 (1992); ALI Federal Income Tax Pn)Ject, Reporter s
Stud~ Draft, Subchapter C (Supplemental Study 39-40 (1989).

r
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porate payor level and in the hands of the foreign
investor.
The bias described above could be mitigated by disallowing any ded uction for U.S. corporate interest payments on foreign-held
portfolio debt. This would expand the current section 163(j) treatment of tax-exempt
interest payments
to foreign related parties by overleveraged U.S. corporations." However, even after interest deduction disallowance, a significant structural
bias in favor of foreign-held debt would still remain
because the foreign distributees of dividends
on Ll.S.
portfolio equity would face a 30- or 15-percent U.S.
withholding tax whereas the foreign recipients
of interest on U.S. portfolio debt would pay no u.s. tax.

The federal income tax base is eroded
by interest payments that bear a zero
tax rate both at the corporate payor
level and in the hands of the foreign
investor.
This latter bias against dividends could obviously
be overcome by imposing an appropriate Withholding
tax on outbound
interest payments. Unfortunately,
when the Federal Republic of Germany did so in 1989,
the access of German borrowers to international
capital
markets was substantially
curtailed and the withholding tax was promptly repealed. II The world of international finance has evolved to a competitive standard of
zero withholding on portfolio interest and any contrary
unilateral move by the U.S. would presumably
cause

'''H owever, thiIS approach would mean that deductible
corporate Interest payments to U.s. debtholders would be taxed at
the debtholder's ~~rginal rate whereas nondeductible payments
of tax-free portfolio Interest to foreign debtholders would be taxed
at the corporate debtor's marginal rate. This is not an attractive
outcome. Furthermore,
foreigners would respond by making
loans to noncorporare U.s. taxpayers who would rvlend the
money to U.S. corp?rations.
ThL' compl('xities of a look through
rule would be required to combat this tactic. Compare the U.S,
Tr('~sury's recent Comprehensive Business Income Tax proposal,
which ~,youJdgenerally make all corporate interest payments nondcductfblc but tax-free. Treasury Integration Report 40-.n 48.49
80.
.
,
,

the German experience to be replicated. Stated differently, it does not seem feasible to address the tax
system's bias in favor of foreign-held
U.S. corporate
debt by imposing a withholding
tax on outbound interest payments."
An alternative is to negotiate
with our treaty partners to reciprocally reduce the withholding
rate on
portfolio dividends to zero." Outbound portfolio interest and dividends would then receive identical withholding tax treatment. This would, of course, result in
a loss of the current 30- or IS-percent
dividend withholding tax revenue. However, U.S. equity investments
would be more attractive, and even if interest payments remained fully deductible,
every foreign investor who switched from U.S. corporate
debt to U.S. equity would be switching from an investment that bears
a zero tax rate at the corporate
level to an investment
that bears a 34-percent corporate-level
tax. Thus, an
ameliorating
revenue pickup would occur." Furthermore, if disallowance of the deduction
for corporate
interest payments on foreign-held
Ll.S. corporate debt
were implemented I; at the same time as the proposal
for negotiating
zero dividend withholding
in bilateral
tax treaties, the loss of dividend
withholding revenue
would be at least partially paid for by the revenue gain
from the new 34-percent corporate
level tax on funds
used to make outbound interest payments." It would
indeed be useful for econometricians
to estimate the
effects of these revenue losses and gains to determine
the extent to which bilateral treaty reductions of the
dividend
withholding rate to zero would impose a
revenue cost on the income tax system.

1,2 See ALI Tax Treaty Report 194-95; Staff of Joint Comm. on
Tax. n.' Genera.1 Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the
Defjl;lt ~eductlon Act o~ 1984, 391-92 (Comm. Print 1984).
. While the followmg analysis might support the Ll.S."
unilateral
abandonment of ~ividend Withholding, it seems better
for t~e ~.s. to extract reciprocal concessions through bilateral
negotiations. See gellerally Treasury Integration Report 48-49 7980; ALI Tax Treaty Report 184.
'
, I~This i~ n.ot to assert ,that the revenue pickup would be suffictent to eh~·\lnate the WIthholding tax loss or to produce a net
revenue gam The suggest··
'·
.
'..
ton IS mere Iy t h at the revenue loss from
e Itrrunatmg
dividend withh ldi
'.
0
mg wou Id be lessoned by an offsetting gam For a more d t iled
I .
Re
., 101.·AI
cal ,---u ana YSIS, see Treasury Integration
pOI :;l,
an J. Auerbach "Co
'R
.
centives and Opt'
fe'
rpora e estructuring: Tax In665-66 (1990).
Ions or orporate Tax Reform," -l3 Tnx Lm:l'. 663,
15

"ALI Tax Treaty Report

194 n,515.

13/11 set' note 10.
I"See note 14.
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